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Die Rose, die Lilie, die Taube, die Sonne,
Die liebt' ich einst alle in Liebeswonne,
Ich lieb' sie nicht mehr, ich liebe alleine
Die Kleine, die Feine, die Reine, die Eine;
Sie selber, aller Liebe Bronne,
Ist Rose und Lilie und Taube und Sonne.
—Heinrich Heine

Quam parva sapientia regitur mundus!
—Latin maxim

O könnt' ich fliegen wie Tauben dahin,
weit hinweg vor dem Feinde zu flieh'n!
in die Wüste eilt' ich dann fort,
fände Ruhe am schattigen Ort.
—William Bartholomew
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Introduction:
Leaf by leaf the roses fall, but the will of their gardener ensures perennial growth. The
hue of the pedals, the strength of the stems, the size of the buds: a testament to man and nature,
the care of the former exemplifying the glory of the latter. Constant care throughout the seasons,
from spring awakening to autumnal repose, tempers linear illusions of progress with the cyclical
harmonies of creation. The labors of the loving cultivator strengthen his flowers against
agitations ephemeral and perpetual. From his choice of soil, to the location of his plot, his efforts
intertwine the necessities of reason and faith.
Intuiting the ideal conditions for their flourishing, the gardener wisely supplements the
material necessities of his crop with the spiritual intimations of their growth. Faith in the seed of
the first cause and its attendant succession of changes, hope for the cooperation of the weather,
wonder at the fragility of life and the essence of existence: all inform his agricultural endeavors.
In choosing to carefully attend his flowers, the revelation of life is reasoned; he believes and
knows.
The vitality of the rose, though, is never guaranteed. If the gardener puts all of his faith in
nature, blindly assuming that the physical world will naturally yield what he desires, his flowers’
stunted growth and wilted pedals will evince his folly. If he puts all of his faith in himself, the
artificially engineered roses he produces will betray, in their botanic verisimilitude, the
substitution for truth with lies, imperfect life with perfect death.
We of the Western world, that geographically diffuse and creatively kaleidoscopic
civilization, are the inheritors of a garden that, by the will of its cultivators, shall flourish or
perish to the extent that we grasp the indivisible imperative of the transcendently objective and
immanently apparent. The rose of our intellectual, ethical, artistic, and political patrimony shall
wither or blossom on the metaphysical soils we choose to lovingly cultivate, and from our
philosophies and theologies shall the choice of barbarity or sublimity, desecration or
conservation, and disillusionment or enchantment be effected for the judgment of posterity.
To think that a life lived philosophically is predicated solely on reason, while a life lived
religiously is predicated solely on faith, is to emasculate God and eroticize tyranny. To perceive
a vast chasm between thinking philosophically and thinking theologically strains the explanatory
powers of both, and strengthens neither. In essence, to philosophize meaningfully is to
contemplate the deepest recesses of reality and the highest domains of the intelligible, to
examine the interiority of subjective being and the exteriority of the objective cosmos; to
theologize meaningfully is to desire the same end by different means.
The following paper is an extended defense of this idea, explained through a detailed
analysis of the epistemic structures of Western philosophy and theology. After elaborating upon
their differences, I delineate their fundamental congruence: proceeding from epistemically
similar acts of faith, the noblest forms of philosophizing and theologizing conduce in a unitary
apprehension of Truth. The enchanted intellect, that which substantiates the veracity of
theological truth claims while metaphysically orienting the trajectory of philosophical truth
claims, is, in the pursuit of wisdom and the negation of ignorance, one that rejects both the
constraints of ideology and the limitations of rationality. After examining the epistemic
challenge of religious pluralism, I conclude with an analysis of Western culture, detailing the
intellectual, societal, and psychic chaos of our times.
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Philosophical Approaches to Obtaining Knowledge:
To distinguish philosophical intellection from other forms of thought, this section will
address two interrelated questions: “What is philosophy, and to what end is philosophical
thinking employed?,” and “What are the characteristics and assumptions of Western
philosophizing?”
Elucidating a comprehensive definition of philosophy is far beyond the scope of this
paper; even if I could provide a systematic and (accurate) interpretation of each of the rough
demarcations of philosophical history, to account for the plethora of forms that Western
philosophizing has taken (treatises, dialogues, confessions, essays, books, etc.) and the particular
socio-cultural differences separating specific thinkers and their ideas is well above my
intellectual grasp. However, I think it is appropriate to outline briefly my understanding of
Western philosophizing, to distinguish it from other forms of thought.
I posit that Western philosophizing is, in its essence, the pursuit of wisdom and the
negation of ignorance. To think philosophically is not to belong to a particular school of thought,
or to adopt a particular methodology. The highest aspiration of philosophical thought is to
ascertain what is True and reject what is False. The capitalization of these words does not entail
blind casuistry, with the mechanical discernment of what is correct and blind rejection of what is
not. Rather, the philosopher is deeply concerned, if but implicitly, with addressing meaningfully
the ‘Life Questions’: “Why I am here?,” “What is love?,” “For what purpose do the cosmos
exist?,” etc. If these questions were unanswerably evinced, philosophy would become an
exercise in intellectual futility. The fatal error of postmodernist philosophy, however, is that it
falsely ‘answers’ the questions (while really begging them entirely) in assuming Truth to be
truths, and what is False to be valid differences of opinion.
With respect to what the characteristics and assumptions of Western philosophizing are,
they include: (1) The use of reason, (2) the presupposition of a particular anthropology of man,
(3) a tendency to reject blind authority and dogmatism, and (4) the use of both dialectic
argumentation and historical perspective. While this is certainly not an exhaustive account of
what constitutes philosophical ways of thinking, it details a wide swath of such thought as it has
occurred throughout Western history.
‘Reason’ is an amorphous term with connotations ranging from “consciousness of mind”
to “pure intellect,” but reasoning is the way, through careful consideration of what is known and
what is believed, what is observable and what is thought, and what is objectively true and
subjectively determined, by which ignorance and a lack of knowledge is ameliorated, inversely
proportional to the wisdom ideally acquired through such thought. In a line of philosophical
inquiry, an inordinate number of potential ideas or postulates may be considered. There are no
required methodologies or frameworks; a question (i.e. ‘What is beauty?’) or proposition (i.e.
‘All men are created equal.’) is posited, and an argument is substantiated in the pursuit of
understanding and addressing meaningfully the notion or ideas at hand. Beyond a smattering of
logical prescriptions (i.e. the law of non-contradiction) and the understood objectivity of
mathematical theorems and equations, there are no required objects of the intellect, boundaries
of inquiry, or foundational premises that necessarily ground philosophical ways of thinking.
The philosophical use of the intellect proceeds from a particular anthropology of man,
from a presupposed understanding of what constitutes the human person. For the ancients, the
cosmos was suffused with transcendence as its inhabitants constituted a purposive part of
creation. Socrates speaks of being possessed by a “daemon” that guided his intellection, Aristotle
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writes obliquely of the ‘unmoved mover,’ and man inhabits an enchanted world metaphysically
intelligible and teleologically oriented. St. Augustine and his medieval successors presupposed
man to be an embodied soul within an explicitly Christian anthropology, stressing the free will of
His creation in the providentially ordained cosmos of His design. Falling away from this,
Descartes and his early modern successors assumed a mind-body dualism, one which over the
coming centuries leads directly into our modern preoccupation with the constructed self,
apparently possessed of a tabula rasa intellect and an infinitely immutable identity.
To philosophize as an embodied soul, endowed with intellect and teleologically,
providentially oriented in the purposive cosmos of His design, is diametrically opposed to
philosophizing as a constructed self, evolutionarily adapted to contingent circumstances of
power, sex, race, and class in an intrinsically meaningless universe. To be able to distinguish
what is True as opposed to what is False requires the former; the latter effectively entails
philosophical decrepitude.
There is also a tendency to reject authority and dogmatism in Western philosophizing, but
this is admittedly a checkered characterization. Lest we think of the philosopher as a freethinking
individualist, smashing every idol and preconceived notion along the path to Truth, there is a
certain conformity of thought in the philosophical tradition. We blithely take Descartes as the
exemplar of philosophical thought: the intrepid rationalist who was able to stand athwart of
religious superstition and declare resolutely cogito, ergo sum. Every philosopher who has
followed Descartes is ‘forced’ into mirroring Descartes: what unique or new or interesting or
novel ideas can I, the individual, sola ratio argue philosophically? The priesthood of cryptoCartesians predominates the philosophical clergy, but their centuries-old clericalism regrettably
discredits and blurs what could be a more comprehensive and richer understanding of
philosophy. There is nothing inherently wrong with a philosophically freethinking individualism,
but it is wrong to think that the philosopher necessarily breaks down every myth and refutes
every empirically unverifiable notion, in the quasi-Protagorean pursuit of a metaphysicallydecoupled humanism.
So, while it is true that there is a tendency to reject authority and dogmatic thinking in
philosophical thinking (as exemplified by both the early modern philosopher qua Cartesian idolsmasher, and the modern philosopher qua Nietzschean god-smasher), there is also a strong (and
indeed, ironical) tendency for the philosopher to express allegiance to, or align himself with,
particular schools or methodologies of thought. Whether in the murky divisions between analytic
and continental thought, in the profusion of ‘neo-’philosophies, or the ideological commitments
that stem from endorsing philosophical systems (i.e. liberalism), a given philosopher is more
likely than not to find himself beholden to any number of idols, his implicit commitments to
idol-desecration notwithstanding. The ideal philosopher is capable of rejecting authority or
dogmatism; the actual philosopher is as wedded to ideas as irrationally or on the basis of blind
faith as any other individual.
Yet, the philosopher is more likely than such an individual to recognize when they are
believing an idea on the basis of authority or dogmatically, which brings me to the final
characteristic of Western philosophizing enumerated above: the use of both dialectic
argumentation and historical perspective. The philosopher par excellence of the entire Western
philosophical tradition is surely Socrates, immortalized and glorified as he is in the dialogues
written by his devoted student Plato. In a very general sense, all Western philosophizing is
grounded in the heuristic of careful dialectic that Socrates perfected, exemplified by the Socratic
admission of ignorance and his eponymous method of rigorous dialogue and careful questioning.
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The good philosopher today must act as both an historian and a dialectician, carrying out
solid lines of argumentation while concurrently examining what is old so as to make anew what
is perennially True. To resolutely dismiss the truth claims of the ancient or medieval period is to
arrogantly presuppose an inherent virtue within modern thought, one that the unmitigated
intellectual and physical chaos of the last five centuries should surely cause us to question.
Theological Approaches to Obtaining Knowledge:
To distinguish theological intellection from other forms of thought, this section will
address two interrelated questions: “What is theology, and to what end is theological thinking
employed?,” and “What are the characteristics and assumptions of Western theologizing?”
The historical and cognitive outlines of Western philosophy are discernible and fairly
constant, even when accounting for disparate forms and contexts. Western theology, in sharp
contrast, has no such continuity. The oral traditions of Judaism are rejected by the Church
Fathers as Jesus’s ministry is codified into the imperatives of the Roman Catholic Church;
medieval disputations and dense scholasticism intellectualize the notion of God to heights of
incredible abstraction; the epistemological quandary of Protestant theology (i.e. sola scriptura)
overthrows the unified experiential knowledge of Latin Christendom; Deist interpretations of a
rationalist God coincide with the increasingly strict separation of church and state; Moral
Therapeutic Deism (Smith) renders God a benevolent friend of subjective understanding and
personal belief. In short, Western theologizing has no historically consistent form.
However, even though the semblance of historical uniformity that characterizes Western
philosophizing is absent in Western theologizing, this does not mean that a general definition of
theology is impossible to posit, at least according to my own experience of it to date. Essentially,
Western theologizing is the understanding of God through the intellect, anchored and bounded
by religious truth claims. The Western monotheisms ascribe to God similar attributes and
venerate Him as the transcendent Being that created the cosmos, continually creating and
providentially ordaining everything within it (without otherwise doing the logically impossible).
God, apprehended in very different ways by the Christian and the Jew, and differently still within
each of the innumerable sects and divisions of each faith, is understood through the intellect, via
theological writings. Every theological writing is both anchored and bounded by specific truth
claims that orient the person theologizing within a specific faith; to think unmoored from or
beyond these truth claims is to think outside of Western theology, per se.
Given this understanding, the end to which Western theologizing is employed is a greater
comprehension of God analogous to the philosophical pursuit of wisdom and the negation of
ignorance. To theologize is to clarify intellectually and affirm religiously what the truth claims
of the theologian’s faith are, for the betterment of the faithful.
With respect to what the characteristics and assumptions of Western theologizing are,
they include: (1) The use of truth claims that are taken to be indisputable, irrefutable, and
irrevocable, and that function as epistemically unassailable anchors from whence the essence of
the religion is derived (and beyond which the religion cannot go), and (2) a grasp of the
transcendent expressed through historical, scriptural, institutional, and personal means. It is
surely impossible to give an exhaustive account of what constitutes religious ways of thinking,
but with respect to an explicitly theological way of thinking, these two multifaceted details are
vital.
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A religious truth claim (i.e. “Christ is the Son of God,” or “The Trinitarian God is
comprised of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost”) expresses, as a formulated statement, that
which is indisputable, irrefutable, and irrevocable: in the simplest terms, it cannot be disputed,
refuted, or revoked. Such claims simply are, and it is far from a grammatical quirk or a trick of
semantics to identify a statement of religious fact as that which, by definition, is. Now, such
claims are not self-evident or naturally intuitive; a vaguely ‘spiritual’ combination of words is
not epistemically strong enough to be a religious truth claim. A given religious truth claim acts
as both an epistemic anchor and a boundary for the particular faith, and it is in this respect that
such formulations serve mutually compatible and crucial roles. To take as an example the above
formulation “Christ is the Son of God,” this statement anchors all Christian belief by identifying
resolutely that x is y without exception, at all times. The incontestability of this statement
withstands the changing tides of Christian belief in the West, for as an anchor it moors and
strengthens Christian belief as a bulwark against the vicissitudes of life. For the Jewish believer,
the truth claim that “God revealed His commandments to the Israelites through Moses at Mount
Sinai” grounds a religion otherwise diffuse and atomized throughout history, especially in
consideration of the post-exilic diaspora. A religious truth claim also bounds a particular faith by
serving as a form of epistemic security, guarding against that which fundamentally disputes or
negates the essence of the religion. One cannot, as a Christian, say something beyond the idea
that “The Trinitarian God is comprised of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” If the
Christian were to speculate that He was an octotarian God or an entirely human creation, this
would constitute a transgression of a formulation that cannot by definition admit of
transgression.
Stemming from this epistemic certitude is the essence of the religion, and from the
acceptance and belief of religious truth claims are religions said to be different, with the
specificity of these claims constituting the shared belief system of a religion and from whence
the virility (or impotence) of its explanatory power is derived. One cannot accept a Trinitarian
God and be Jewish; one cannot be Catholic and deny the divinity of Christ; one cannot accept
papal infallibility and be a Protestant. In the lived experience of every religion, of course, there
are countless differences and divergences of belief between sects and amongst individuals, but
this multiplicity of perspectives does not undermine the essential dimensions of Christianity as
fundamentally distinguished from Judaism, and vice versa. On the Ship of Theseus that is a
religious worldview, removing a fundamental truth claim is akin to removing a large section of
the flooring; even if it is replaced with something else, the boat will not be a seaworthy vessel.
A kind of contact with the divine, or a transcendent experience, also frequently informs
theological reasoning, one that is usually expressed in the paradoxical act of writing or
expressing in words that which is ostensibly ineffable. Such an experience is usually described in
terms of spiritual ascension or a point of heightened consciousness, where the body and soul of
the individual are united in an apprehension of what Is. Understandably, the language that is
often used to explain this type of divine contact is connotatively vague or supernatural; there is a
mystical quality to this felt presence, and it strains the boundaries of human rationality and
conventions of language.
While it is not necessary for one to have a mystical experience, a recognition of that
which is transcendent and otherwise beyond the bounds of ordinary intellection informs the
historical, scriptural, institutional, and personal means of theological expression. Historically,
events occur in the life of a faith (the Israelites wander in the desert during the Exodus; Saul is
converted to Paul on the road to Damascus) that become part of its historical heritage. The
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memory of these events is preserved and brought forth into the present through written Scripture.
When Biblical injunctions or prophetic stories are recalled through sermons, tracts, lessons, and
processes of religious instruction, the historical distance of the events and persons is diminished
through the ‘presence’ of textual immediacy. As the scriptures are codified, the biblical texts
become the basis for institutions; a hierarchy of authority is established and a codification of
rules and doctrines occurs whereby orthodoxy and heterodoxy become visible. The faith
organizes, and through its structural apparatus across time (via physical churches and
synagogues, seminaries, publishing houses, the Vatican, Calvin’s Geneva, etc.) there becomes an
institutional understanding of how historical knowledge and scriptural interpretation are to be
understood. Finally, there are individuals who, being either born into the faith or who convert
into it, take their personal experiences and think theologically in dialogue with the historical,
scriptural, and institutional elements that they come to understand, insofar as they are committed
religious believers.
There is a messiness to the convergence of history, scripture, institutions, and individual
religious belief that inform theological thinking, but all of the above elements inform
theologizing at every level of comprehension. It is impossible to disentangle the historical
development of a religion from its scriptural interpretations, its institutional formations, and its
personal manifestations. Each of these (and the epistemically unassailable truth claims that
anchor and bound the faithful) are part and parcel of the theological epistemology. In thinking
so, the end of theological Truth is ideally attained.
Tensions: Philosophical and Theological Ways of Thinking
At this juncture, it is worth reviewing the descriptions of philosophical and theological
thought I have posited: Western philosophizing involves the use of reason, the presupposition of
a particular anthropology of man, a tendency to reject blind authority and dogmatism, and the
use of both dialectic argumentation and historical perspective. Western theologizing involves the
use of indisputable, irrefutable, and irrevocable truth claims that function as epistemically
unassailable anchors from whence the essence of the religion is derived (and beyond which the
religion cannot go), and a grasp of the transcendent expressed through historical, scriptural,
institutional, and personal means.
I have framed both types of thought as different means by which the pursuit of wisdom
and the negation of ignorance may be effected; in light of this, the conventional dichotomy
between the two is misleading. However, I consider there to be important tensions between the
two, including the need for epistemic anchors and boundaries in theologizing that are in no way
required for philosophizing, and the theologian’s need, not required of the philosopher, to
conceptualize the transcendent.
These required anchors and boundaries would be considered inflexible in a line of
philosophical argumentation. There is a contingency to philosophizing that allows it to proceed
cautiously or skeptically, ideally defusing absolutist understandings of philosophical Truth.
Contrarily, there is a certitude to theologizing that allows it to proceed reverently with an
epistemic enforcement of belief, ideally tempering both relativist and absolutist understandings
of theological Truth. The reason that the philosopher is popularly stereotyped as a radical
freethinker, and the theologian lambasted as a straitlaced dogmatist, is because the ideals of their
pursuits of Truth are grounded in conceptually divergent, metaphysical imperatives. The former
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need not endorse any particular idea or statement; the latter must not reject or subvert any idea
or truth claim pertinent to his religion.
The theologian needs to conceptualize the transcendent because of the specific revelation
that constitutes his faith: what is revealed theologically is understood in terms of both temporal
existence (i.e. immanence) and atemporal profundity (i.e. transcendence). By this, I mean that
the adoration and worship of religious figures or ideas is conducted either in a cyclical (i.e. the
liturgical calendar of Catholicism) or linear fashion (i.e. the lived progression of one’s life from
infancy to senescence, from baptism to entombment) in time, but the understanding of those
same ideas and figures transcends the finite demarcations of humanly conceptualized time. That
which is revealed in the religion is understood, even if but implicitly or unclearly, to be beyond
time or even to be beyond lived existence, the timeless gift of God for His time-bound creation.
The revelation of the Hebrew prophets, each hearing the voice of God and speaking in a human
tongue, personifies this mystery. Contrarily, philosophical reasoning proceeds freely without the
need for divine understanding. The transcendence of theological thought may or may not be
given philosophical credence.
Theology requires a frame of mind intelligent enough to take seriously the validity and
legitimate presence of a transcendent dimension to existence. Now, it is not required of the
Christian theologian to affirm the existence of Krishna any more than it is required of the Jewish
theologian to affirm the redemptive power of Christ. But, to be a theologian in either faith is to
take seriously and accept as real that which is otherwise invisible, does not admit of empirical
verification, and is accepted epistemically on faith or intuition, as opposed to being proven
through rigorous argumentation. The existence of angels and of souls is perfectly within the
bounds of reason, insofar as these things are not logically impossible. The existence of unicorns
is also perfectly within those same bounds, but to believe in the existence of angels and of souls
is to affirm epistemically unassailable, religious truth claims; religious transcendence requires a
faith epistemically unnecessary for philosophical reasoning.
The kind of empirically unassailable faith present in theological thought is imaginatively
evinced in a passage from Henry Adams’s travelogue of medieval cathedrals, Mont. St. Michel
and Chartres. Speaking to the likely effect that the cathedrals’ architectural designs would have
had on the medieval Christians who observed firsthand the glass windows and stylized
woodwork in such places, Adams writes, imagining a typical Mass of the period:
How many women are there, in this mass of thirteenth century suppliants, who have lost children? Probably
nearly all, for the death rate is very high in the conditions of mediaeval life. There are thousands of such
women here, for it is precisely this class who come most; and probably every one of them has looked up to
Mary in her great window, and has felt actual certainty, as though she saw with her own eyes—there, in
heaven, while she looked—her own lost baby playing with the Christ-Child at the Virgin’s knee…the earth,
she says, is a sorry place, and the best of it is bad enough, no doubt…but there above is Mary in heaven
who sees and hears me as I see her, and who keeps my little boy till I come; so I can wait with patience,
more or less! (Adams 196)

While Adams’s depiction of the bereaved mothers at Chartres is fictionalized, the sense
of living, breathing faith evident in the religious believers attending Mass is profoundly real.
Given the reduction of Judaism and Christianity to social phenomena in the contemporary West,
it can be difficult to imaginatively sympathize with the understanding that the woman that Adam
describes knows both that her lost child is really ‘playing with the Christ-Child,’ and that Mary
really ‘sees and hears’ her. The metaphysically transcendent unity of mother and child speaks to
a faith that need not inform any philosophical reasoning.
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Necessary Synthesis: Philosophical and Theological Ways of Thinking
If the philosophical way of thinking is broadly constitutive of ‘reason,’ and the
theological way of thinking that of ‘revelation,’ there does not seem to be any reason why the
two should be epistemically synthesized. To many contemporary Westerners, looking back over
centuries of bitter religious warfare and the hard-won struggles for the separation of church and
state, the suggestion of unifying sacred, theological discourse with secular, philosophical
considerations is repugnant. Philosophical inquiry must appear to be proceeding adequately
without any consideration of theology; theological inquiry, likewise, appears to be doing the
same without any consideration of philosophy. If the philosophers have their ‘God’ and the
theologians have theirs, so much the better for both.
This distinction is deeply mistaken. Its validity requires a superficial construction of
theology and philosophy as bracketed areas of disparate consideration, irreconcilably divided.
Contrary to common misperceptions, philosophical and theological ways of thinking conduce to
a full apprehension of Truth, their necessary synthesis substantiating the veracity of theological
truth claims, and metaphysically orienting the trajectory of philosophical truth claims. To
explicate this claim, I will first elaborate upon the specific dimensions of this necessary
synthesis, conceptualizing theological and philosophical ways of thinking (in their noblest forms)
as employing different means to achieve the same virtuous end. This will involve an analysis of
their synthesis in a Cartesian ‘moment of intuition’ and a mystical, ‘Beatific’ experience of
transcendence; effectively, ‘reason’ and ‘revelation’ possess deeply similar epistemic structures,
and together, as a unified way of life, require faith and intellect in the pursuit of Truth. Then, I
will elaborate upon the enchanted intellect that I posit is capable of synthesizing the epistemic
structures of philosophy and theology without rejecting both. Responding to Leo Strauss’s
explicit rejection of the synthesis that I advocate, I will finally argue that Strauss’s perspective
implicitly complements my analysis.
Necessary Synthesis: Cartesian Intuition and the Beatific Vision
The enchanted intellect is such that every act of philosophical reasoning is informed by
the religious knowledge of its thinker, as every act of theological reasoning is informed by the
philosophical knowledge of its believer. The thinker and the believer are the same person, of the
same intellect, of the same soul; there is no epistemic dualism involved in thinking theologically,
as opposed to thinking philosophically.
Of course, the seeming impossibility of this is compounded by the frequent invocation of
an admittedly powerful ‘either-or’ dichotomy between philosophy and theology. A plethora of
divergent, mutually incompatible truth claims, opinions, conjectures, reasoned inquiries,
diatribes, remarks, etc. on religious thought and philosophical thought render the two ways of
thinking either intractably solid or amorphously liquid, ambiguously sketched or objectively
drawn. It is quite easy to be jerked violently back-and-forth between the two epistemic
structures, and an entire worldview, a complete way of thinking, seems so easily condensed and
neatly conceptualized into one or the other. But this is ultimately to indulge an intellectual
schizophrenia, and the explanatory power of both theological and philosophical thought is
consequently diminished. Profound thought about God and philosophy involves, for each, an act
of cognition that becomes, for the individual thinker, objectively and self-evidently true.
Regarding the epistemic structures of philosophy and theology, and how they proceed from these
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respective acts of cognition, I posit that, in their noblest forms, both ways of thinking proceed
from an epistemically identical point of faith, and then employ different intellectual means to
achieve a virtuous end.
And those are the justifiably elitist terms: noble forms of epistemic structure, employed in
their respective ways towards a virtuous end. In the American milieu (and indeed, most of the
contemporary West), talk of ‘virtue’ and ‘nobility’ are the epitome of aristocratic snobbery,
deeply unpalatable to our dual ethos of democratic equality and capitalist fervor (‘Every man a
king…who hath a credit card’). Yet, there are alternatives to our self-induced malaise of
equalitarian consumerism, and I think that it is a propos of this that intelligent people, when
grappling with the ‘Life Questions’ (which are the ultimate origins of all inquiry, religious,
philosophical, or otherwise), must attempt to resurrect those buried ideals and their high-minded
connotations, thinking in such a way that they are able to transcend, philosophically and
theologically, the purely rationalist or reductionist explanation that puts a cordon sanitaire
around the profound to preserve the mediocre. To define ‘noble’ thought and ‘virtuous’ ends is to
put an unwarranted period on a sentence that is necessarily incomplete, but I know that a
flourishing of both arises when individuals recognize their ignorance, refuse to peddle absolutes,
and take the complete person as being of heart and mind, love and intelligence, soul and
intellect.
The point of faith from which the epistemic structure of philosophy proceeds takes the
form of a Cartesian ‘moment of intuition,’ an understanding of inference as the basis for clear
and distinct ideas. Descartes conceives of inference as “an internal process which operates with a
criterion of truth and falsity that is beyond question” (Gaukroger 117). The act of intuition is
“instantaneous…and it consists in a clear and distinct grasp of an idea” (118), recognized as
immediately true to the thinking person. “Exhibited paradigmatically in the case of mathematics”
(123), “Descartes makes the image-forming power of the imagination the basis for the operations
of reason” (124), taking mathematical equations or theorems (and indeed, “geometrical
constructions…the end of apparently infinite processes of division,” etc. (Ibid.)) as being
profoundly necessary, intuited self-evidently. In the Cartesian ‘moment of intuition,’ that which
is understood (e.g., ‘2+2=4’) is understood to be both necessary and profoundly transcendent. A
recognition of the inescapable veracity of the equation, recognizing that ‘geometrical
constructions’ (and indeed, all of mathematics) can take on infinite forms, is that which
epistemically grounds philosophy on an apprehension of the necessary and the infinite,
mathematical truth imposing itself upon the apprehender.
Similarly, the point of faith from which the epistemic structure of theology proceeds
takes the form of a ‘Beatific’ moment of transcendental experience; an experiential contact with
the divine (i.e. God), transcending ordinary sense experience, sparks the flames of religious
belief. As a generalized phenomenon, it manifests in specific ways for the individual believer; a
mystical vision of Christ, or a profound realization of the immortality of a loved one’s soul, are
all essentially ‘Beatific.’ Conceptualized by Eliezer Berkovits as the felt presence of that which
simultaneously threatens to destroy you as it sustains you with its love, this moment of contact is
such a profound personalization of the transcendent that its validity cannot be denied by the
individual believer. Even if they are not particularly dramatic or publicly evidenced (as would be
the convulsions of a mesmerized Pentecostal in a fit of religious fervor), these experiences
epistemically initiate and affirm theological cogitation.
At the moment of this spiritual illumination, there is an epistemic comparison to be
drawn between it and the moment of Cartesian intuition. In the ‘Beatific’ moment, that which is
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understood (i.e. a mystical vision of Christ) is understood to be both necessary and ultimately
infinite; a recognition of the inescapability of the vision, or grasping the infinitude of the
temporal moment, founds theology on an apprehension of the necessary and the infinite, grasped
as an external reality imposed inexorably upon the apprehender. For this person, such a moment
can neither be empirically rationalized nor explained away as a fanciful delusion. The man
enraptured can no more deny the imposition of this force upon his soul than he can rent asunder
the fetters of gravity. Now, when one reasons mathematically, one usually does not feel borne
aloft on the wings of religious fervor; and similarly, in the moment of religious transcendence,
one usually is not thinking of that which is mathematically intuitive. However, what both
cognitive realities, the intuition of clear and distinct ideas and divine contact, possess
fundamentally is a unified use of reason and faith in apprehending what is incontestably True.
The intellect does not disappear during a ‘Beatific’ moment of transcendence. To dismiss
such a recognition as the manifestation of a mental disorder is to callously invalidate the veracity
(and presuppose the falsity) of a type of human experience basically universal in its efficacy (i.e.
the peoples of native cultures and Western organized religions alike attest to such experiences,
however vastly different the spiritual contexts), in the ideological service of an ironclad
methodological naturalism. Similarly, during the intuition of a ‘clear and distinct idea’ a
comparably profound (albeit emotionally attenuated) act of faith occurs; there is a knowing to the
truth of such an idea that is analogous to the knowing of a contact with the divine. The truth of a
mathematical equation (e.g., ‘2+2=4’) and the truth of a ‘Beatific’ experience (i.e. a mystical
vision of Christ) are a unitary apprehension of Truth. There is faith in the intellect that a ‘clear
and distinct’ idea (the implicit or explicit foundation for many a line of philosophical
argumentation) is true, and there is faith in the intellect that an experience with the ‘divine’ (the
implicit or explicit foundation for many a line of theological argumentation) is true. Both are but
necessarily synthesized forms of the same cognition, present in a unified, enchanted intellect.
And it is indeed, the enchanted intellect that understands the epistemic structures of
theology and philosophy as, in their noblest manifestations, conducive to a virtuous end. To
blithely assume a bifurcated intellect, where loving wisdom and thinking about God are disparate
cognitions, is to indulge a childish Manichaeism. Naturally there are important differences in a
given binary, but the epistemic borders between theology and philosophy are far more porous
than is generally assumed, and especially so when it comes to the vaunted distinction between
‘reason’ and ‘revelation.’ Extremisms of rationality and religiosity wrack spiritual and physical
devastation in equal measure, and it is dangerously naïve to divide what is necessarily
complementary. We are endowed with the capacity for reason and the capacity for faith, and to
deny the potential of one is to invariably cripple the potency of the other. Where Theo plants,
Sophia must grow; what Philo sows, Deus will reap. Only together shall the infinite capacity for
creation and destruction latent in the human heart be tempered, in the arduous yet humble
apprehension of Truth.
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Delineating Truth and the ‘Enchanted Intellect’:
Of course, the very idea of a ‘capital-T’ Truth strikes many Westerners as an odious
concomitant of political or religious extremism, a singular and all-encompassing understanding
of reality believed by fanatics and lunatics. If a man were to declare to all those around him that
every precept, every idea, and every notion that he believed or thought to be true was absolutely
correct, he would be immediately derided as unworthy of serious consideration.
The tragic irony of this description is that many of us seriously believe that we possess
the Truth that is our beliefs, precepts, notions and thoughts. Challenges or rebuttals to our most
dearly (and even not-so-dearly) held ideas are reflexively, if not a priori, dismissed; so many of
us are implicitly so desperate to know what is ultimately true in the ‘liquid-modern’ world we
inhabit, where all of the old certainties, societal norms, and fundamentals of life admit of
questioning, invite dramatic re-interpretation, or can casually be negated or dismissed (Bauman),
that we cling to whatever we think is true ever more tightly. The typical Westerner possesses a
contradictory admixture of nonjudgmentalism and ironclad ideological commitments: “what I
hold to be true is Truth for me, and what you hold to be true is Truth for you, until I can convince
or force you to think like I do.”
A residue of social decorum still inhibits some of us from publicly pronouncing our
judgments and ideas on matters political, ethical, religious, and societal as infallibly veridical,
but in the privatized-digitized world of the twenty-first century, we frequently scream the
anonymously triumphant, inchoate cry of absolutism. Many of our most cherished beliefs (the
absolute equality of the sexes, the unquestioned virtue of liberal-democracy, the good of creating
individual identity uninhibited by tradition or birth, the positives of technological change
accompanied by unrelenting economic progress) are held with a dogmatism that would have put
the scholastics to shame, and without the metaphysical stability that was provided by the
cloistered environs within which those medieval thinkers lived. In effect, many of us who openly
proclaim the virtue of nonjudgmentalism hypocritically practice the ostensible vice of deep
prejudice to all that opposes our worldview.
When I speak of philosophical and theological epistemic structures ideally conducing to a
full apprehension of Truth, that apprehension entails rejecting the false truths of ideologies
(across the entirety of the political spectrum), ‘-isms,’ (Liberalism, Marxism, Libertarianism,
Feminism, ad nauseam) understood as codified (read ‘ossified’) formulations of social orthodoxy
(i.e. control), as well as rejecting the absolute virtue of uninhibited identity formation. In line
with my understanding of philosophy and theology as seeking the pursuit of wisdom and the
negation of ignorance in differing ways, we must begin by seeking that which is intellectually
and spiritually virtuous, and rejecting that which is intellectually and spiritually vicious. In
negating ignorance, we must begin by rejecting our ideological commitments (as being
intellectually vacuous) and the self-evident virtue of our personhood (as being spiritually
vacuous). In pursuing Truth, we must begin by striving for and aspiring to attain, however
fleetingly and imperfectly, the love of what is Good, True, Beautiful, Perfect, Just, etc.
I cannot define precisely what is Good or True, but the humble (and continual) desire for
its attainment by those whom E.M. Forster referred to as the “aristocracy of the sensitive, the
considerate and the plucky” (Forster 73) attests to its validity, exemplified by the epistemic
potency of the Cartesian ‘moment of intuition’ and ‘Beatific’ experience. These ‘capital-letter’
notions become absolutist when either philosophy or theology self-aggrandize, and the pursuer
becomes the pursued, committed utterly to the unambiguous glorification of God or Mind,
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religion or rationality. Knowledge of what is True is, ultimately, in possession of those who
wisely make receptive the unified intellect to what is both impressed upon the knower and what
the knower knows independently of what is impressed. Far from endorsing a paltry relativism or
attitude of skeptical disinterestedness, what we must do is begin to strive for the love of these
ultimate essences of ‘knowing,’ and seriously emulate, philosophically and theologically, those
men and women throughout history who have been wise (rather than merely intelligent or
perspicuous), who have been able to grasp beyond the limiting exigencies of their fleeting
existences, and who have possessed enchanted intellects, theological and philosophical.
Yet, what I have presented here may, ironically, be but another ideology, another ‘-ism,’
another assertion of subjective belief masquerading as objective Truth. All this talk of the Good
and the True, of the ‘negation of ignorance,’ of intellects enchanted, may be nothing more than
vague pabulum. It smacks of a traditionalist conservatism rooted in Platonic idealism, with
intimations of orthodox Christianity. How is the religio-philosophical notion I have described
any better than the ideologies I just castigated for being ossified formulations of social control?
Christianity and Platonism may act as authoritarian mechanisms of social control, as have all
organized religions and philosophical schools when employing intellectual and/or physical
coercion to enforce conformity of thought and action.
Such criticisms are well-warranted, but I would wager that I have posited a terrible
ideology, failing to possess the hallmarks of any good ‘-ism.’ Most importantly, the
comprehension of Truth, the virtuous end to which I take the noblest epistemic structures of
philosophy and theology conduce, entails an enlightened capacity for doubt and uncertainty. We
must distinguish between the postmodernist obsession with ambiguity and the obviation of
Truth, and the capacity for reasonable doubt about what one believes or thinks; the former is a
full-throttled denial of philosophy, theology, the human condition, and the empirically verifiable.
Strewn as we are amidst the spiritual, psychic, intellectual, and often physical wreckage
of modernity, there is something deceptively comforting about being able to construct an identity
and sew a framework of ideas out of whole cloth, impervious to criticism. The perverse
creativity of identity madness and the paradoxical inflexibility of the constructed, postmodernist
self, are reinforced through belonging to any rigidly defined school of thought, any ‘-ism’ worth
its ideological ‘salt,’ any coterie of like-minded, ‘right-thinking’ individuals who dictate the
perfect ‘us’ against the evil ‘them.’
The ideologies and ‘-isms’ that substitute curiosity with obedience derive their strength
from a lack of curiosity about the cosmos and an absolutist conception of false ‘truth.’
Contrarily, he that is committed to pursuing Truth daily walks the epistemic tightrope between
the dark chasm of self-abnegation and the vaunted heights of virulent conviction. The epistemic
obligations that the enchanted intellect entails are greater than a theologically or philosophically
absolutist intellect; the convergence of Truth from both epistemic structures tempers the
extremisms of both without rejecting one or the other.
Belief in religious truth claims, epistemically anchored and bounded, metaphysically
orients philosophical lines of inquiry, undergirding the enchanted intellect. This orientation
‘locks’ the thinker within certain boundaries and upon certain foundations that, rather than
constrict free thought to the point of suffocation, give him the capacity for greater virtue and less
evil than the purely rational individual. As all moral codes are believed and followed from
metaphysical imperatives, however tenaciously believed (and unlike the rationally legalistic
system of Western liberalism, coated with but a residuum of metaphysical dust, quickly blowing
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away), the person striving for Truth is guided and indeed impelled by the theological thought of
his philosophy (and, obviously, vice versa).
A genuine aspiration for what is Good or Beautiful, imperfectly pursued, necessarily
entails an appreciation for the manifold complexities of human nature while tolerating, perhaps
to a fault, the striking dissimilarities and divergences between individual understandings of what
is Good or Beautiful. Yet, there is simultaneously an understanding in Truth and the essences of
‘knowing’ that recognizes that, ultimately, what is capital-T True is really true, as distinguished
from what is capital-F False, which is really false. In a repudiation of the hedonism, egoism,
materialism, relativism, etc. that a purely ‘reasoned’ (i.e. ‘philosophized’) approach to existence
entails, and an equal repudiation of the religious fundamentalism and extremism that a purely
‘revealed’ (i.e. ‘theologized’) approach to existence entails, I posit that the individual, within the
epistemic framework I advocate, seeking the pursuit of wisdom and the negation of ignorance
will ultimately be striving for the use of an enchanted intellect, where contact with the
theologically divine and philosophically substantive will unify the intellect and body, the mind
and the soul in substantiating the veracity of theological truth claims, and metaphysically
orienting the trajectory of philosophical truth claims.
And I cannot stress enough how vital it is for the theologically substantive and the
metaphysically philosophical to intertwine. When mankind favors the purity of the ‘reasonable’
mind, the savors of freedom from ghostly abstractions and spooky superstitions are perceived as
a delight to the intellect. The triumphalism of the philosophes and the brightest minds of the
Enlightenment are a lasting testament to the intoxicating effects of an unbridled humanism; our
very notions of ‘progress’ and ‘improvement,’ at a material, societal, and psychological level are
beholden to the dawning of a bright future that so many minds of the 16 th through 20th centuries
imagined. And indeed, technologically and economically, the world has advanced upon the lines
that these thinkers delineated, leaving us in but a short half-millennium with unparalleled
technological and economic growth and achievement. If ever was there a time to praise the
mechanical ingenuity and physical creativity of homo sapiens, this would be that epoch.
But something was steadily degraded in this concatenation of mechanical growth and
progressive change, and it was the soul of the West. As Western man steadily improved himself
physically, his spirit sank further and further below him, until the shadows of his divinity were
utterly obscured by the lights of his rationality. Out of the blinding rays of philosophy sans
theology came barbarity; out of the fractured splinters of theology sans philosophy came
stupidity. These sad, unintentional outcomes would have been significantly attenuated if more
had chosen the life of the humble, enchanted intellect, rather than the fantasies of the
theologically deluded or the catastrophes of the philosophically blinded.
Intellectual curiosity and epistemic humility are not Enlightenment-era inventions.
Because there is an enmeshing of the immanent and transcendent in the enchanted intellect, there
is a deeply compatible comprehension of Truth understood philosophically and theologically.
Surveying modernity, I find it impossible to feel hope in the efforts of man unaided by faith, of
intellectual efforts unmoored from metaphysically transcendent imperatives. The tremendous
creation of ‘Enlightened’ man is very difficult to reconcile with the incalculable destruction of
property, geography, culture, and human life that it ultimately entailed. We have perilously
forgotten what was once inexpressibly intuited about Truth: the ineffable essence of the
transcendent and the physical nature of the immanent are perceived and felt by a singular
consciousness, a unified mind, an embodied soul.
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Objection: Strauss and Potential Incompatibilities
I contend that the enchanted intellect is both possible and desirable for its apprehension
of philosophical and theological Truth. However, this is a conception deeply antithetical to the
understanding of the philosopher Leo Strauss, in his masterful examination of ‘reason’ and
‘revelation.’ Given that Strauss was an influential expositor of the idea that the two are basically
irreconcilable, it is worth giving some attention to his understanding of philosophy and theology,
laid out clearly in the essay “Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western
Civilization.” Strauss explicitly denies the possibility of synthesizing, necessarily or otherwise,
the epistemic structures of the theologian and philosopher:
…it seems to me that the core, the nerve, of Western intellectual history, Western spiritual history,
one could almost say, is the conflict between the biblical and the philosophic notions of the good
life…it seems to me that this unresolved conflict is the secret of the vitality of Western
civilization…the very life of Western civilization is the life between two codes, a fundamental
tension. There is, therefore, no reason inherent in the Western civilization itself, in its fundamental
constitution, why it should give up life. But this comforting thought is justified only if we live that
life, if we live that conflict. No one can be both a philosopher and a theologian, or, for that
matter, some possibility which transcends the conflict between philosophy and theology, or
pretends to be a synthesis of both. But every one of us can be and ought to be either one or the
other, the philosopher open to the challenge of theology, or the theologian open to the challenge of
philosophy. (Strauss 116; emphasis added)

Strauss delineates how a fundamental tension exists throughout all of Western intellectual
history between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem,’ exemplified by “the life of autonomous
understanding” needed by Greek philosophy for the former, and “the life of obedient love”
needed by the Bible for the latter (Strauss 104). Given the divergent orientation of each ethos,
Strauss argues that they are in permanent tension with each other, never admitting of genuine
synthesis; however, the tension possesses such an intrinsic vibrancy that, as long as each of us
chooses either to be “the philosopher open to the challenge of theology, or the theologian open to
the challenge of philosophy” (Strauss 116), that vital tension need not perish. I think that Strauss
recognizes an important tension; as I noted earlier, the need in theologizing for epistemic anchors
and boundaries, as well as a conceptualization of the transcendent, speak to an ‘obedience’ that
the supposed autonomy of philosophizing does not require.
Consequently, for Strauss the choice of intellectual autonomy or loving obedience is a
choice between opposed worldviews, not diametrically so but rather presuppositionally. To begin
thinking from an initial point of divine love is radically different from thinking initially from a
point of unrestricted intellect, but they are not hermetically sealed off from each other. Strauss
stresses the need for both, but we must individually choose the way of life that we see fit; we are
either spiritually motivated or enchanted in our theological considerations, or we are
intellectually motivated and reasoned in our philosophical considerations. The ‘philosophertheologian’ corrupts the first part of his title and vulgarizes the second. Because they are
worldviews (and as such are all-encompassing ways of comprehending reality), it is impossible
to achieve a synthesis of these two perspectives beyond the superficial. The philosopher can no
more honestly submit himself to an ‘obedient love’ in his inquiries, than can the believer
honestly inquire autonomously, independent of God. Because both Greek philosophy and the
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Hebrew Bible presuppose different existences for their adherents, the idea of synthesizing, let
alone necessarily synthesizing these ways of life is implausible for Strauss.
To elaborate on Strauss’s idea here, the presupposition of either autonomous reason or
Scripture ends up creating two distinct ways of life, one proceeding in a broadly philosophical
(i.e. ‘reasoned’) way, and another proceeding in a broadly theological (i.e. ‘revealed’) way. The
practical implications of the former manifest in a devotion to secular life; even though they are
usually inadequately philosophical, those living lives of autonomous reason represent those who
overwhelmingly occupy positions in business, government, academia, and the media, working
for and leading organizations of which they are the managerial, corporatist, bureaucratic elites.
The practical implications of the latter manifest in a devotion to spiritual life; owing to this
preference over worldly concerns, those living lives of obedient, Scriptural love overwhelmingly
do not occupy the same positions of power and privilege as do their secular counterparts. Perhaps
framed as the split between ‘head and heart,’ the ‘reasoned’ individual is first and foremost a
thinker, rationally adjudicating the concerns of his worldly existence. The ‘revealed’ individual
is, contrarily, a lover, attending spiritually to the concerns of his present and future existence,
corporeal and immaterial.
As the ways of life that philosophy and theology entail are presuppositionally
contradistinguished, the ethos of each requires a specific orientation towards God or intellect,
‘reason’ or ‘revelation’ in Strauss’s terminology. However, Strauss intimates the following
towards the end of his essay, interestingly complementing the epistemic synthesis I advocate:
If one can say colloquially, the philosophers have never refuted revelation and the theologians
have never refuted philosophy, that would sound plausible…And to that extent we may be said to
have said something very trivial; but to show that it is not quite trivial, I submit to you this
consideration…philosophy must admit the possibility of revelation. Now that means that
philosophy itself is possibly not the right way of life. It is not necessarily the right way of life, not
evidently the right way of life, because this possibility of revelation exists. But when then does the
choice of philosophy mean under these conditions? In this case, the choice of philosophy is based
on faith. In other words, the quest for evident knowledge rests itself on an unevident premise. And
it seems to me that this difficulty underlies all present-day philosophizing…that philosophy or
science, however you might call it, is incapable of giving an evident account of its own necessity.
(Strauss 131; emphasis added)

Because either the philosophical or theological worldview and way of life is unable to
refute the veracity of the other, both stand as separate but legitimate possibilities, with each of us
still capable of choosing the philosophical or the theological life. However, there is tremendous
importance in Strauss’s admission that, because of this inability, revelation may rightfully be
admitted into philosophical considerations, and faith ultimately impels the choice of philosophy.
In the case of the former, a rejection of methodological naturalism on the part of the philosopher
opens his ostensibly autonomous intellect to the viability of religious truth claims. In the case of
the latter, it is the recognition that the choice to philosophize is not self-evidently true, but rather
proceeds from an act of faith that is congruent with the choice to theologize.
Strauss fails to recognize what I consider to be an inability for us to cognitively divide
theological and philosophical epistemic structures. By this, I mean to say that we can reasonably
theorize philosophy and theology as disparate areas of inquiry, respectively rooted in
autonomous reason and Scripture, but in the lived experience of thinkers and believers, the two
cannot be dissociated. Strauss’s stress on the autonomy of reason is epistemically questionable
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because there is no way to mentally divide the free exercise of reason from the capacity for
obedient love. There is a unity to the intellect that has been increasingly obscured by centuries of
careless dichotomization. The theological thinker does not cavalierly abandon his capacity for
philosophizing the moment he begins to think about God, and neither does the philosophical
thinker his capacity for theologizing. There is no definitionally prescribed way to be a
philosopher as opposed to a theologian.
Superficially, there is a marked difference between the professional theologian and
philosopher, but this is a matter of historical contingency, not an indisputable bifurcation. The
perniciousness of this divide, of course, is evidenced in how we stereotype both the intellectual
and the religious believer. The former is an erudite scholar, contemplating profound ideas using
exquisite jargon and impressive argumentation. The latter is an incoherent idiot, believing
superstitious nonsense peddled to the gullible and uneducated. This characterization of the
religious simpleton against the intellectual sophisticate is nothing more than a timeworn,
Enlightenment-era canard. Given that sophisticated, intellectual types spurred on the untold
miseries of the twentieth century, the deaths of tens of millions resulting from the
implementation of their secular fantasies, we would do well to temper our disdain for the
religious believer. I think that Strauss’s characterization is false because the epistemic gap
between ‘reason’ and ‘revelation’ that he proposes is only superficially divisive. Intellectual
elites and the devoutly religious have proven themselves quite capable of blind, superstitious
prejudice, whether it be masked in political platitudes or devotional exercises. Moving away
from this false characterization, if the religious person should be ‘open to the challenge of
philosophy’ or vice versa, we have all the more reason to coalesce philosophy and theology.
The individual will to believe x is bolstered and strengthened by the shared convictions
of the theological or philosophical communities that one inhabits. The secular ideologies of
Western liberal-democracies are a corrupted example of this logic. A worldview and way of life
oriented around a secular devotion (i.e. Liberalism, Capitalism, etc.) is possible because the
individual is consistently reinforced in their beliefs by the parameters of groupthink. The
assumption, both explicitly and implicitly articulated, is that the actions and beliefs of secular
elites are self-evidently true; the truth claims they advocate and which countless millions
internalize and propagate are vainly cultivated on the barren metaphysical soils of Western
hyperpluralism.
The choice Strauss posits between intellectual autonomy and divine obedience is clearly
rooted in his profound understanding of Western faith and intellection, and its strength rests on
the reality that there are indeed subtle and important distinctions between a predominantly
theologized worldview and way of life, as distinguished from one that is predominantly
philosophized. Strauss would likely deny the possibility of an enchanted intellect because
‘enchantment’ inextricably entails theology, and ‘intellect’ philosophy. However, he rightly
notes the distinction is far more opaque once it is recognized that, because “the philosophers
have never refuted revelation and the theologians have never refuted philosophy” (Strauss 131),
the certainty of either way of thinking is not apparently discernible but for the act of faith in
autonomous reason or divine revelation, in his conception.
Contrary to this understanding, I posit that the Cartesian ‘moment of intuition’ and
‘Beatific’ moment of transcendence typify the unification of philosophy and theology in a
singular apprehension of Truth, and it is because of the act of faith that fundamentally predicates
both ways of thinking that our intellect is either enchanted or disenchanted, open to the
possibility of humbly aspiring to the knowledge of what is Good and Beautiful, or blindly
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craving (and asserting) the knowledge of ‘either-or’ absolutism. When ‘either-or’ becomes ‘andand’ in a unified apprehension of Truth, the inability of philosophy to give “an evident account
of its own necessity” allows for the enchanted intellect to cohere ‘reason’ and ‘revelation,’
underpinned on epistemically similar acts of faith. Truth is apprehensible with a unified intellect
that strives for the Good, the Beautiful, etc., while recognizing that our one life ought to be lived
on an act of faith that courts both theological and philosophical understanding.
It is a choice to epistemically synthesize philosophical and theological ways of thinking,
the sparks of their intellection ideally setting alight the flame of Truth. And that is, for the
contemporary Westerner at least, the operative word: choice. A stunning plethora of possible
answers, possible solutions, and possible ways of thinking about the world and one’s place
within it abound and confound. And it is undeniable that he who is not sensitive to the
impressions of philosophical or theological Truth will not be able to comprehend it in its totality,
regardless of how frequently one engages with religious apologetics or self-intuitive
mathematics. The present bifurcation of ‘superstitious’ religion and ‘enlightened’ reason is
epistemically tyrannical, if only because the choice of ‘enlightened’ reason seems, both at a
cursory and (frequently) deep examination to be, the choice of intelligent, educated people.
Western governmental, journalistic, intellectual, and creative endeavors all epistemically
champion ‘reason’ to such an extent that those pursing ‘revelation’ are segregated and, if not yet
physically subjugated, intellectually relegated to a position of inferiority, wrongly castigated as
backwards and deluded.
I know that there is more honest, common-sense virtue in the thinning pews of the local
Protestant church than in the bustling corridors of the United Nations. Regrettably, the
credentialed elitism of the meritocracy persuasively divides the stupid from the reasonable, and
the rational from the religious. The believer and the thinker alike tragically accept this division,
and thus religious alienation corresponds to rational triumphalism. An epistemic division is
cemented sociologically. However, because we stubbornly continue to believe in something
higher than ourselves, many modern Westerners, having rejected institutional religious belief as
irrelevant and obsolete, gleefully throw themselves at the clay feet of their favorite secular
ideologies, providing all of the fun of religious extremism without any of the messy
transcendence. It becomes seemingly obvious: man is the measure of all things, and we can
dismiss or affirm whatever philosophical or theological arguments or ideas that are necessary for
the fulfillment of that ideal. Intellect need not be enchanted, for we are the self-evident
enchanters of our own lives.
However, this (deeply flawed) assumption of ours is one that Strauss speaks to in his
essay, and his analysis provides further credence for the enchanted intellect. He writes:
The first characteristic feature of modern thought as modern thought, one can say, is its
anthropocentric character…I contrast it with the theocentric character of biblical and medieval
thought, and with the cosmocentric character of classical thought. You see this most clearly if you
look at modern philosophy which, while it does not have the general authority which modern
science has, is nevertheless a kind of conscience or consciousness of modern science. One has
only to look at the titles of the most famous books of modern philosophy to see that philosophy is,
or tends to become, analysis of the human mind. You could also see this same trait easily…by
looking at what philosophic disciplines emerged in modern times that were unknown to earlier
philosophy: all are parts of the philosophy of man or of the human mind. The underlying idea,
which shows itself not in all places clearly but in some places very clearly, is that all truths or all
meaning, all order, all beauty, originate in the thinking subject, in human thought, in man…certain
human pursuits which were formerly called imitative arts are now called creative arts. One must
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that man is subject to something higher than himself, e.g., the whole cosmic order, and that man is
not the origin of all meaning. (Strauss 102; emphasis added)

When we solipsistically place ourselves at the center of our individual universes, and
declare arbitrarily that the question of our origins is either unanswerable or evolutionarily
derivative, we stunt something essentially human, something that the ancients and the medievals
recognized in a way that so few of us understand. There are many ‘truths’ and ‘facts’ that derive
their validity from our subjective experiences and beliefs, but Truth cannot be understood as
simply created, like a painting or a sheet of cookies. The desacralized intellect that rejects
transcendence cannot perceive Truth because it is permanently imprisoned within the cave of the
mind, comprehended in purely material and physical terms. Once transcendence is seriously
considered, an epistemic orientation towards attaining Truth can be effected, obviating the
suicidal stupidity of self-referential metaphysics. It requires a unity, a cohesion, a bondedness
that understands the mind to be but a constituent (and absolutely crucial) part of what is a soul.
The choice for our objective and subjective understandings of reality to be metaphysically
ordered, where the enchanted intellect unites immanent and transcendent through a rejection of
what is False and a yearning for what is True, is one that we must make if we are to salvage our
minds and hearts.
The Epistemic Challenge of Religious Diversity:
I have posited that the enchanted intellect apprehends Truth by synthesizing, on an
epistemically identical act of faith, philosophical and theological ways of thinking in
substantiating the veracity of theological truth claims, and metaphysically orienting the
trajectory of philosophical truth claims. Having delineated the dimensions of philosophical
thought, I have decidedly begged the questions of which theology and what God I am referring to
theologically. Such considerations must be addressed.
If I proceed to substantiate a specifically Catholic, or Protestant, or Jewish notion of the
Western monotheistic God, and affirm the worship rituals, traditions, creeds, and texts attendant
to that faith (or sect thereof), Truth seems to immediately fracture into a subjective chaos of
interpretative confusion. The tendentiousness of declaring x Western religion and its belief
system correct does not escape me, as it seems to entail an exclusion of Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, Confucians, atheists, agnostics, and all other believers and non-believers throughout
the West from possessing the enchanted intellect I have described. Religious pluralism is, in
short, an epistemic nightmare: how can anyone convincingly articulate the correct theology,
when the absence of one or a different choice seems plausible?
My ‘solution’ to the problem of religious pluralism, albeit imperfectly substantiated, is
articulated below, but I should explain a couple of things from the onset. I strongly reject the
notion that all religions are equally valid, as well as the prevalent imperative for ecumenical
coexistence. The law of non-contradiction seems to require a choice between either one or
another religious tradition. Christianity is fundamentally different from Islam, for example, and
those two religions will coexist only once they have both been properly denuded of their
transcendence, and beaten into submissive domestication. Christianity is tamed throughout the
West and consequently of little import for many tens of millions; it is to the immense credit of
orthodox Christians, of all persuasions, that they continue to profoundly believe the Gospel of

Perry 19

Jesus Christ. It is not fearmongering to note the simple truth that once a proselytizing religion
loses its ability to convincingly do so, and fails to believe in its own explanatory narrative (i.e.
much of Western Christianity), another, more confident and virulent faith (secular or otherwise)
will surpass it (i.e. Islam, as is happening in Western Europe) (Murray). Huge swaths of Arabia
and Asia embrace the theological transcendence of Mohammedan devotion; far from faulting
them for this, the West should learn from their profound devotion, epistemically informed and
tempered by philosophical intellection.
In proceeding along the following line of argumentation, I shall have to speculate within
reason, but I trust that my conjectures are sound, although obviously open to dispute. Against the
backdrop of secularized, 21st century hyperpluralism, I will argue that, for the typical Westerner
seeking the enchanted intellect:
1. Not all religious beliefs are viable.
2. The religions that are viable for the typical Westerner are the textually grounded
religions of Judaism and Christianity.
3. Each of these religions are similar manifestations of the Real (à la John Hick’s
‘spheres of salvation,’) and the believer bridges the Kantian gap between the
phenomenal and the noumenal, thereby affirming the Truth of his religion.
4. The epistemic challenge of intra- and extra- religious incompatibilities requires a
practical humility in adjudicating religious Truth. The believer maintains that the
Truth of his religion is indisputable, but by virtue of a Hegelian ‘negation of the
negation,’ it becomes possible to philosophically interrogate one’s religion,
enhancing both epistemic structures of the enchanted intellect.
Point 1: For the typical Westerner, not all religious beliefs are viable.
In an age given to priding itself on its ideological commitments to globalization,
transnationalism, and the international exchange of commerce and people, to speak of certain
religious beliefs as being invalid for the contemporary Westerner, situated as he is at the
geographical crux of neoliberal economics, seems ridiculous. Theoretically, at the very least, the
sheer profusion and intermixture of cultures, ethnicities, nationalities, and ways of life
throughout much of the cosmopolitan West should indicate a booming plurality of possible
religious beliefs. The problem with this assumption is that it wrongly universalizes all forms of
religious belief as being equally valid or open to acceptance. Chanting the blasé tones of a
monochromatic ecumenism, we forget the arresting contrapuntalism to be heard in the
polyphony of William James’s “Will to Believe”:
Let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to our belief; and just as the
electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either live or dead. A
live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I ask
you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature,--it refuses
to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab,
however (even if he be not one of the Madhi’s followers), the hypothesis is among the mind’s
possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic
properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act.
The maximum of liveness in hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that
means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all.
(James 2-3; emphasis added)
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There are obviously Westerners who practice quite happily the traditions of Islam,
Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and a plethora of other comparatively minor, non-Western
faiths; these individuals obviously merit the same protection of religious freedom accorded
Christians, Jews, and non-believers. For the majority of people in the West, however, these
religions are effectively James’s ‘dead wires,’ and because of this are ones that the average
Westerner will not likely be able to seriously believe.
Point 2: The religions that are viable for the typical Westerner are the textually grounded
religions of Judaism and Christianity.
A monolithic brush cannot be painted over all non-Western forms of religious belief;
there are thriving elements of all of these religions and practices throughout the West, and they
help add to a sense of cultural ‘diversity’ that, outside of the ideological prescriptions that that
term unfortunately carries, should be admired as indicative of the toleration for religious freedom
that our civilization has painstakingly cultivated. However, I still maintain that the ‘dead wires’
of religious belief are very much ‘dead’ to the average individual; thus, the religions that for
Westerners are in fact viable are those that historically have shaped so much of what we are and
continue to be, namely the textually grounded religions of Judaism and Christianity.
Christianity pervades the historical, artistic, linguistic, ethical, intellectual, and
governmental milieu of Western civilization, and as it is still demographically prevalent, capable
of proselytization, and admits converts, it constitutes in its Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant
variants the theological tradition and religion in which most individuals seeking an enchanted
intellect will be able to believe. Jews are obviously capable of having an enchanted intellect as
well, but because Judaism does not proselytize and is a covenentally bounded, ethnically tightknit faith, for most Westerners it is not the viable means to an enchanted intellect.
Of course, why these two faiths specifically are of such critical importance to the West is
both quite obvious and extremely difficult to understand; for the purposes of my argument, I
should like to limit our focus to what metaphysically both faiths share, and whence their vitality
arises. As they came about when, in the West, we “had sufficiently assimilated and internalized
both the skills and the structures of thought afforded by systematic writing” (Fallon 120), both
Judaism and Christianity:
…represent a radical paradigm shift away from magical, naturalistic, or animistic forms, interested
in control of the environment and personal and group survival by the placation of some erratic,
unpredictable deity, to a more rational, more humanistic form interested in moral values, in
virtues, in questions of right and wrong, good and evil, reward and punishment…They represent a
shift from exterior concerns of the body to interior concerns of the soul…They represent a shift
from action to contemplation, from verbalization to (abstract) nominalization, from “man as doer”
to “man as thinker,” from the external life of the internal, from materialism to etherealism, from
monistic pantheism to dualism, from immanent transcendence to immanence and transcendence.
(Fallon 121)

As Christianity and Judaism are textually-based religions, the imaginative and creative
effulgence of this transition, detailed in the above citation as the remarkable way by which we
transitioned from a purely oral culture to a culture of written words and alphabetic languages, has
oriented the West morally and philosophically for over two millennia. It is perhaps the most
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generalized explanation for why both faiths have maintained the potency and spiritual legitimacy
they have, for as long as they have. In effect, because the sparks of Western civilization were
ignited during the Axial Age, the time “of Elijah, Isaiah, and Jeremiah in Palestine; of “Homer,”
Plato, and Aristotle in Greece; of Jesus Christ and the New Testament evangelists in Palestine
and Greece” (Fallon 120), is one in which the foundational metaphysics of our civilization were
planted. The Western psyche is indelibly imprinted with the cultural, societal, linguistic, and
ethical mark of God the Father and Christ Jesus, and thus the respective traditions of Judaism
and Christianity constitute the ‘live-wire’ religions for the typical Westerner.
Point Three: Each of these religions are similar manifestations of the Real (à la John Hick’s
‘spheres of salvation,’) and the believer bridges the Kantian gap between the phenomenal
and the noumenal, thereby making his religion True.
Taking the two prevalent monotheisms as the likeliest forms of religious belief for the
contemporary Westerner, it is worth noting that the above explanation of their origins, as a
consequence of the paradigm shift from orality to literacy, should not be understood in purely
rationalistic, social-scientific terms. The objective quality of the transcendence felt and known to
be real by millions of religious believers, experienced in the ‘Beatific’ moment of intuition, is
incontestably True, independent of strictly rational analysis. I posit that the typical Western
believer’s variant of Christianity or Judaism, the epistemic structure of theological Truth, should
be understood as a manifestation of the ‘Real,’ conceptualized as one of John Hicks’s ‘spheres of
salvation.’ Taking each tradition to “offer salvation…[through] the transformation of human
existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness” (Hick 54), Hick takes each major
religious tradition to be “a cognitive response to the universal presence of the ultimate divine
Reality that, in itself, exceeds human conceptuality” (63). With respect to the Truth of the viable
Western religions, both Judaism and Christianity, across their sectarian differences, divergences,
and divisions, are ways by which the Westerner takes his naturally selfish individuality and
reforms it as an inward spirituality, ‘saving’ himself in response to the externally objective, True
presence of the ‘Real’ beyond all ‘human conceptuality.’
Of course, the ‘Real’ can all-too-easily be understood in purely psychological,
materialistic, or imaginative terms, as an intensely creative human response to external stimuli
and internal consciousness, forcibly removed from considerations of transcendence and Truth.
Drawing on the Kantian correspondence between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Hick
articulates the following in response to objections about the extent to which the Real is beyond
human rationality:
…we might well ask, why postulate an ineffable and unobservable divine reality-in-itself? If we
can say virtually nothing about it, why affirm its existence? The answer is that the reality or nonreality of the postulated noumenal ground of the experienced religious phenomena constitutes the
difference between a religious and a naturalistic interpretation of religion. If there is no such
transcendent ground, the various forms of religious experience have to be categorized as purely
human projections. If on the other hand there is such a transcendent ground, then these phenomena
may be joint products of the universal presence of the Real and of the varying sets of concepts and
images that have crystallized within the religious traditions of the earth. To affirm the transcendent
is thus to affirm that religious experience is not solely a construction of the human imagination but
is a response-though always culturally conditioned-to the Real. (Hick 61)
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For Kant, the phenomena of the world (things as they appear to us) is distinguished from the
noumena (things as they are in themselves); about the latter we can know nothing, for knowledge
is possible only of phenomena. However, because phenomena are noumena conceived (and thus
connected to, and pointing towards) an external world, the different religious traditions (of which
Judaism and Christianity are the operative ones for Western civilization) are different
conceptualizations of the ‘Real,’ theologically True for the individual believer.
Point Four: The internal and extrinsic contradictions of religious pluralism merit humility
in adjudicating religious Truth. By virtue of a Hegelian ‘negation of the negation,’ a
philosophical interrogation of faith conduces to the enchanted intellect.
However, the epistemic challenge of intra- (i.e. the differences between Reformed
Protestantism, Lutheranism, Catholicism, Pentecostalism, etc.), and extra- (i.e. the profound
differences between Judaism and Christianity) religious incompatibilities poses something of a
problem for the believer, even once secure in his faith. Hick intimates that, with respect to
different religious traditions
…they cannot all be wholly true; quite possibly none is wholly true; perhaps all are partly true.
But since the salvific process has been going on through the centuries despite this unknown
distribution of truth and falsity in our cosmologies and eschatologies, it follows that it is not
necessary for salvation to adopt any one of them. We would therefore do well to learn to tolerate
unresolved, and at present unresolvable, differences concerning these ultimate mysteries. (Hick
61)

I disagree with Hick’s negative conclusion about salvation; I think that it is necessary to
reject a studied relativism with respect to religious truth claims. Religious belief is True for the
enchanted intellect, not ‘possibly true.’ Yet, I do think that there is something valuable about a
sort of toleration for unresolvable theological differences. Yet again, I think that attitudes of
toleration frequently degenerate into attitudes of milquetoast relativism, wrongly blurring or
altogether removing the important distinctions and differences between religions. To universalize
religious belief is to trivialize it out of existence; the idea that Islam is Hinduism is Christianity is
both stupid and dangerous. This is the attitude of secular elitism, first and foremost, and as such
it should be repudiated as a rejection of tradition and the uniqueness of each faith.
As a ‘solution’ to the epistemic problem of religious pluralism, I think that the enchanted
intellect should maintain a ‘gentle absolutism’: my religion is incontestably True as opposed to
yours, but because I am a thinking, philosophic person, I must exercise a practical humility in my
religious convictions and in adjudicating differing religious truth claims. A balance should be
struck between a tepid nonjudgmentalism and a violent fundamentalism; the humility that arises
from our imperfect quest for Truth necessitates a fundamental respect for others while
maintaining the righteousness of our faith. For example, the utilitarian calculus of Rav Shagar’s
belonging to a religion or believing in its Truth simply because it is an attractive social
construction, “no less valid an option than others” (Pessin 207), is too paltry a religious
understanding for the Truth that the enchanted intellect seeks. He who desires to possess an
enchanted intellect must belong to the form of Christianity or Judaism that he believes, because it
resonates so profoundly in his soul that it is True, even as he humbly interrogates it
philosophically. This process of interrogation and affirming belief, conducive to a deep
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understanding of theological Truth, is articulated well in Hegel’s ‘negation of the negation,’ as
follows:
(a) A simple (and oversimplified) historical analogue of the dialectic of something and other is
this: Before the emergence of Protestantism, Catholicism is just (Western) Christianity as
such. It then generates Protestantism, which negates it. Protestantism is not just nonCatholicism, but actively differentiates itself from it and bears the marks of the Catholicism
that it negates. Catholicism in turn negates Protestantism, thereby ceasing to be simply
Christianity as such and bearing the marks of its active self-differentiation from Protestantism.
(b) An unreflective Catholic and an unreflective Protestant come to reflect on their respective
faiths (perhaps owing to their awareness of the difficulty of substantiating either faith in
opposition to the other). They then lapse from, or negate, their faiths. But each still bears the
marks of the faith he negates or sublates: a lapsed Catholic is different from a lapsed
Protestant, since such negation is determinate. Subsequently, by further reflection each
reacquires the faith he lost: he negates the negation. But neither returns to the unreflective
faith he lost: it is now a reflective faith, enriched by the return journey by which it was
reached. (Inwood 201)

Even without stepping into the metaphysical abstractions of Hegelian terminology, it seems
apparent to me that the individual who can respond to religious difference, challenge his Truth,
and recognize the enrichment of the intellection is one who is trying to utilize his heart and his
mind, his intellect and his soul.
St. Augustine’s Doctrine of Divine Illumination:
Each of these formulations and theorizations of theological Truth, variously understood
as the Kantian bifurcation of phenomena and noumena, the Hegelian ‘negation of the negation,’
or Hick’s ‘spheres of salvation,’ lack an important element: direct, concrete application. How can
the ‘flesh-and-blood’ Westerner, towards the humble apprehension of philosophical and
theological Truth, emulate practically the enchanted intellect?
Theoria is made praxis in St. Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination, in practical
terms correlating strongly to the idea of an enchanted intellect I have articulated. The specifics of
Augustine’s late-antiquity Catholicism are unimportant, for what matters is how Augustine
bonds the epistemic structures of philosophy and theology. As a neo-Platonist, for him the
grasping of higher, perfect Forms requires a virtuous ascension of the intellect towards the Good
in the pursuit of truth. However, this Good is not that which we can obtain freely, absent the
ineffable truth of God and his incarnate Son (Christ); we must assent to Christian belief as we
require His grace to both receive and understand it, on faith. There are two broadly different
modes of inquiry in function: the Platonic cognition of Forms requires one to ascend to a higher
apprehension, while the indwelling logos of Christ descends to his creation. The Augustinian
synthesis of the two is the creation of a wholly divine and human point of contact between the
two, an ineffable ‘meeting-place’ between mortal ascension and divine condescension.
Augustine’s neo-Platonism and his Christianity coalesce at this contact where human reason,
aided by divine faith, achieves a cognitive cohesion with divine truth.
Yet, while the indwelling logos of Christ is fundamentally from God, there are other
eternal and unchanging truths of the universe that are not necessarily all holy; i.e. the necessity
and infinity of mathematical forms. Augustine emphasizes in On the Free Choice of the Will that
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just as the rules of God’s wisdom are true and unchanging, discerned in Scripture and felt in the
‘Beatific’ moment of transcendence, so too are the rules of numbers, possessing an intelligible
structure that is also true and unchanging (54). The individual striving for the enchanted intellect
recognizes the apparent disjunction between the ‘philosophized’ operations of numbers and
unchanging mathematical forms, and the ‘theologized’ understanding of the Mediator (i.e.
Christ) and His wisdom, imparted to the faithful. It is possible, obviously, to cognitively reason
through mathematical problems without ever once considering a single religious idea;
conversely, a religious person can profoundly believe in God while never once proving a
mathematical theorem. However, even though many people can perceive mathematical truths
while only fleetingly (or never) receiving divine illumination, this does not mean that the two are
disparate considerations. The fundamental moment of ‘reason’ is epistemically similar to the
fundamental moment of ‘revelation’ in this often overlooked respect: the Cartesian moment of
intuition (i.e. the philosophized, pure use of the rational intellect) necessarily requires God’s
direct assistance to perceive that which is objectively (and indeed, transcendently) True.
Augustine metaphorically frames the doctrine of divine illumination like this:
mathematical truths (i.e. that which is purely philosophized) and religious truths (i.e. that which
is purely theologized) are, respectively, like the brightness and the heat of a fire. The fire is God,
yet the heat affects only what is moved close to it, whereas the brightness is diffused far and
wide. Wisdom is the grasping of Truth philosophical and theological; those that are closest to
this are like those individuals closest to the fire, almost mystically immolated with a love for
Truth that sets their hearts and minds ablaze. Contrarily, those that are farthest away from the fire
are not absent God’s consideration, for all, as God’s creation, is suffused with the ‘light’ of
numbers and mathematical intelligibility (56). Rather, these people (the vast majority, alas) see
the brightness of Truth, however dimly, but are unable to begin feeling the heat of Truth, unable
to recognize that what is ‘reasoned’ and what is ‘revealed’ are from the same source of
illumination.
Augustine argues that both mathematical intelligibility and theological wisdom are
dependent on God, and because of this the doctrine of divine illumination possesses a
universality that encompasses all human intellection. That we all access one and the very same
truths indicates that these truths exist outside our individual minds; that these truths reflect or
manifest necessity and infinity indicates that they must ultimately reside in the necessary and
infinite being; for we finite intellects to glimpse them means that this being must permit us to
“glimpse” into His own being, and thus illuminate our intellects. For Augustine, every act of
either philosophical or theological reasoning requires divine illumination, regardless of how well
or poorly the person philosophizing or theologizing understands this. All intellectual cognition is
enchanted and ultimately True, but because of both our imperfect intellects and confusion about
the epistemically similar act of faith from which all philosophy and theology proceeds, we think
that we have arrived at an understanding of Truth independent of any transcendence, when
actually we have arrived at subjective, self-referential ‘truths.’ The enchanted intellect is aware
of the role of divine transcendence in all cognition, rather than its enchantment being selfevidently intuited.
The doctrine of divine illumination collapses the divide between the immanent and the
transcendent, attempting to cohere the neo-Platonic intellect striving for comprehension of the
Forms and the objective reality of Catholic theology ordained by Christ. Abstracted from the
cultural milieu of late-antiquity, it is the preeminent example of the enchanted intellect for many
reasons. Because of our imperfect intellects and our utter dependence on faith as a means of
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grasping intellectually and ‘Beatifically’ the thrust of Truth, the inklings of an epistemic humility
here are congruent with our contemporary need for tempering both absolutism and relativism in
our theological and philosophical cognitions. By aspiring to a point of mortal ascension
(‘reason’) and divine condescension (‘revelation,’) the seemingly ironclad bifurcation of
‘obedient love’ and ‘autonomous reason’ collapses; the epistemically similar act of faith from
which philosophizing and theologizing proceed becomes overwhelmingly apparent when there is
no theorized divide between the head and the heart. If the pursuit of wisdom and the negation of
ignorance constitute the singular essence of Western ‘reason’ and ‘revelation,’ the search for
Truth informing the late-antiquity doctrine of divine illumination applies to all contemporary
Westerners pursuing the enchanted intellect. We are all trying to find our way home, and home is
where the transcendent and the immanent, the reasoned and the revealed, the philosophized and
the theologized, and the body and the soul are one.
Conclusion:
The Western rose is bathed in twilight, and the sleepiness of her evening visage masks
the fractured chaos of her soul. The soils of the garden whence she struggles to survive are
corrupted and increasingly barren, littered as they are with the metaphysical pollution of every
failed ideology, scheme of social engineering, and rational methodology that has deformed the
hearts and minds of Western man. From the corporate machinations of transnational capitalists,
to the perverse designs of social reformers, the Western garden and her patrimony is increasingly
a heritage of dying flowers.
Some of the cultivators continue to carefully attend to the roses, tenaciously trying to
keep alive a fragile idea, but perhaps they find their efforts increasingly maligned. Most of their
fellow cultivators reject, both implicitly and explicitly, the humble pursuit of wisdom and the
negation of ignorance. They have substituted the faith and reason that that existence would entail
for something infinitely more intoxicating, albeit infinitely less meaningful: the absolutism of
identity and the spiritual emptiness of modernity. Of course, most of them would never think of
their lives in those terms. But in observing these individuals and detailing their actions, a few
cultivators, stopping a moment from their noble efforts of preservation, continuity, and
transcendence in matters Good, True, and Beautiful, can recognize them for what they are.
Many gardeners are pulling up rows of flowers; some of them do this with profound
apathy, others with self-righteous determination. Thinking only in the inanities of contemporary
discourse and the platitudes accepted by their friends and coworkers, many of these philistines
fail to plant but one seed or care for a single rose. From indifference or ideological passion, the
rose is torn from root and the fragile bonds of historical continuity frayed.
A great many cultivators cherish the unbounded potential of the garden for narcissistic
gratification, settling into lifetimes of security and safety, utterly unbothered by the tremendous
problems both intellectual and physical that bedevil their endangered civilization. Anesthetized
by the creature comforts of avarice, busily working to the end of their subjective satisfaction,
such individuals commodify the rose and prostitute her along the global thoroughfares of
commerce.
Some gardeners gather the heritage strewn about the garden and attempt to rebuild a
simulacra of cultivation with like-minded individuals. As all manner of political and social
division occurs, each faction, party, and organization devoting itself to its respective members or
adherents, a fantastic proliferation of identities and perspectives, amplified by the incoherence of
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the digital information environment, destroys the ability for consensus and the points of
unification for an already diffuse culture. Clinging to any number of signifiers and ‘-isms,’ the
left and right alike grind the rose pedals into intrinsically meaningless dust.
There are also those gardeners who deny the existence of the garden altogether, claiming
that while they live in one civilization, it is not a civilization necessarily worthy of admiration or
preservation and is, in fact, no better or worse than any other. Existentially burdened by the
weight of history, evincing a self-hatred and maudlin penchant for guilt curiously absent the
inhabitants of other gardens, they take all gardens to be alike, all peoples fundamentally similar,
and the time when we took pride in our garden, its faults and all, one best forgotten and
dismissed, lest too many of the cultivators be stirred to an act of rebellious remembrance.
Of course, there are also those individuals who would have made wonderful gardeners if
not for being systemically denied the beauties of cultivation. The poor and impoverished, the
culturally isolated and ideologically alienated: all tragically excluded, whether deliberately or
unintentionally, from enjoying fully the fruits of Western patrimony. The rose cries out to the
drug-addicted, the homeless, the lost and dispossessed, and in the intellectual chaos of the
Western world these cultivators-in-spirit fall further away from her love and the sustenance she,
in a less insane time, might have been able to provide.
And this insanity is perhaps best encapsulated by the great bonfire slowly spreading to
engulf the entire garden, ignited from the cultural detritus and lost knowledge that the gardeners,
collectively and individually, failed to preserve and protect for posterity. Drunk with the laughter
of progress, they condemn to fiery obsolescence a discarded hymnal here, a few notions of
romantic courtship there, and a bevy of other ideas noble and worthy, quickly forgotten for the
seductive satisfaction of rights without obligations, and equality without fraternity.
And yet, perhaps the saddest thing the cultivators see, in surveying this tragedy of
metaphysics, is a pile of dead gardeners occupying an increasingly prominent part of the garden.
They are all suicides, their deaths brought about from a profound lack of meaning and the utter
negation of transcendence. Finding the answers to the questions “why existence? why cosmos?”
resoundingly answered with “make up your own reason!” or “who cares?,” it is unsurprising that
the explanatory narratives of purpose that these gardeners came up with were fatally limited. The
atomized self, like the rose, left alone in the garden withers into dust.
So, whither rose? For all of what I believe to be my justified pessimism, the rose of the
West is not dead. She is, however, severely damaged, and the metaphysical soils upon which she
once flourished are fast losing their capability for perennial growth. I have written this thesis in
the hopes of justifying intellectually that philosophy and theology are not incompatible, pointing
to a way by which we may begin to unify the immanent and the transcendent. The most viable
way that we Westerners can substantiate the veracity of theological truth claims while
metaphysically orienting the trajectory of philosophical truth claims is through the enchanted
intellect, pursuing wisdom and negating ignorance. Informed by a varied range of works, from
the social criticism of Neil Postman to the cultural critiques of Morris Berman, from the
intellectual histories of John Ralston Saul and Ryszard Legutko to the analyses of Douglas
Murray and Patrick Deneen, I have tried to argue persuasively a viewpoint antithetical to
contemporary mores, but absolutely vital to the creation of a more meaningful civilization.
Intertwining the necessities of reason and faith, the rose of the West shall flourish in the
alpha and omega of Truth.
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